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# C.I.A. Aide in Saigon Says Data Was 'Enormous'

By M. A. FARBER

The former chief of Vietnamese Affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency testified yesterday that Gen. William C. Westmoreland's command was so generous with information on enemy troop strength that many intelligence analysts complained it was "too much for their in-baskets."

George A. Carver Jr., who appeared in Federal Court in Manhattan as the 13th witness for General Westmoreland in his \$120 million libel suit against CBS, said the command provided "an enormous amount" of both "raw data" and analyses for the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies in South Vietnam in 1967.

Mr. Carver said that, while the C.I.A. and military intelligence officers differed "conceptually" over how best to keep tabs on enemy strength, General Westmoreland's command made every effort to enlighten "anyone who had any interest" in the subject.

"They never withheld raw data from anybody in the intelligence community," Mr. Carver said.

## Former Aide Only Feet Away

As Mr. Carver testified, a former aide at the C.I.A., Samuel A. Adams, sat only feet away at a table reserved for the defendants in the case. Mr. Adams was a paid consultant for CBS in its preparation of the documentary and is one of the individuals named in General Westmoreland's libel action.

General Westmoreland, who commanded American forces in Vietnam between 1964 and 1968, claims that CBS defamed him in a 1982 documentary by saying he had deceived President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the size and nature of enemy forces in the year before the Tet offensive of January 1968.

The CBS broadcast — "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" — said the "highest level" of military intelligence had engaged in a "conspiracy" to minimize enemy strength by deleting the Vietcong's self-defense units from the military listing of enemy strength and by setting an "arbitrary ceiling" of 300,000 on that listing.

The narrator of the program, Mike Wallace, described the removal of the Vietcong's self-defense forces as a "tactic" by General Westmoreland and said the C.I.A. "suddenly, without explanation, reversed its position and

gave in to all of General Westmoreland's demands."

The documentary focused on the events surrounding the formulation in 1967 of a new intelligence estimate on Communist strength in Vietnam for President Johnson. The C.I.A. and General Westmoreland's command wrangled for months, with each side, as they made clear in cables, aware of the "political and public relations" impact of any determination.

Mr. Carver, whose testimony will continue today, was Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs to the Director of Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973. During 1967, the director was Richard Helms, who is expected to testify later in the trial.

Mr. Carver did not appear on the CBS documentary. A week after the program was completed — "locked up" in television parlance — and 12 days before it was aired, he was interviewed for an hour by the documentary's producer, George Crile.

However, two aides to Mr. Carver at C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., in 1967, whose names arose frequently in testimony yesterday, were seen on the broadcast. One was Mr. Adams. The other was George W. Allen, Mr. Carver's deputy, who said on the broadcast that the Vietcong self-defense forces were "an integral part of the military potential of the Communist forces in South Vietnam."

Yesterday — as he sat only feet away from him — Mr. Carver described the 49-year Mr. Adams as a man of "enthusiasm, energy and imagination" who felt there was something "improper" in the way General Westmoreland's command "approached the problem" of enemy strength and the way "it handled some of the data."

## Admonished Defendant

Mr. Carver said, however, that Mr. Adams was also "very prone to jump to conclusions and very intolerant of people who did not share the conclusions to which he jumped."

Judge Pierre N. Leval, ruling on an

objection by David Boies, CBS's lawyer, ordered Mr. Carver's characterization struck from the record.

Mr. Carver recalled an incident in June 1967 when he had to admonish Mr. Adams for sending an "unauthorized" cable to the C.I.A. station in Saigon regarding enemy strength. The cable, Mr. Carver said, contained "a judgment we didn't support" and had "a approved. Mr. Adams was going off half-cocked as he was sometimes wont to do."

Mr. Carver, who said he had never known an estimate of enemy strength to be drawn up that wasn't the object of "disagreement," suggested that General Westmoreland's position on the nature, if not the number, of Communist forces in South Vietnam in 1967 wasn't all that different from his own — and perhaps not that different from Mr. Allen's or even Mr. Adams's.

Over objections by Mr. Boies, the jury was told of a memorandum written by Mr. Allen on July 5, 1967, which summarized conversations between Mr. Carver and his two aides. Mr. Carver was taking the memo with him that week on a visit to Saigon with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

Mr. Allen wrote at the time, and Mr. Carver testified yesterday, that the Vietcong's self-defense forces were "largely unarmed" and were an "indifferently trained and indoctrinated force" that, like the Vietcong's political cadre, "would not — and should not — be used in assessing military matters."

But Mr. Allen, like many of his C.I.A. colleagues, believed these so-called "home guard" units should be included in a separate "nonmilitary" listing of enemy strength. General Westmoreland's position was not only that the self-defense forces should be removed from the order of battle but that they could not be accurately counted. The C.I.A. estimated their strength at 125,000.

Mr. Carver acknowledged yesterday that the C.I.A.'s 125,000 estimate of self-defense force strength was "spongy" and "suggested a degree of precision and solidity which our evidence did not support." So, on his visit to Saigon in July 1967, he said, he looked favorably on a proposal from General Westmoreland's command that the self-defense units only be "described verbally" in intelligence documents.